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Lal'al théologique et philosophique, XXXVIII, 1 (février 1982) 
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS 
OF NATURAL SELECTION 
A RECONSIDERATION 
Gregory Alan PESH y 
P ERHAPS one of the most controversial and monumental theories in the history 
of science was presented to the London Linnean Society on July 1, 1858. While 
the theory of natural selection has been articulated on numerous occasions from the 
ancient Greeks to the modern evolutionary biologists, these versions, nevertheless, 
are invariably compared to -- and measured by -- the hypothesis that was 
formulated by Charles Darwin over an hundred and twenty years ago. 
Darwin's greatness was essentially due to his insights into the nature of natural 
selection; to his having possessed a firm grasp of the universal application of the 
principle throughout the biological world; to be able to support the hypothesis with 
appropiate and quite convincing examples from biology; and to his having 
successfully presented a theory that not only revolutionized the thinking of the entire 
scientitic corn munit y, but that incorporated modifications necessary to silence most 
of the objections raised during the turbulent history of the doctrine of natural 
selection, 
Most evolutionary biologists agree that the existence of the principle of natural 
selection has been definitely proven; 1 however, although most evolutionary 
biologists are satisfied with the experimental evidence establishing the existence of 
natural selection, this does not in any way terminate our investigation of the powers, 
ramifications and properties of natural selection. Universal acceptance of the theory 
does not constitute an actual proof for its existence or its ability to account for the 
biological phenomena,2 Without a profound understanding of the principle with al! 
the accompanying nuances, ramifications and difficulties, our capacity for acquiring 
l. Cf. J.B.S. HALDA'IE, The Causes of Evolution, Ithica, COl'nell Uni. Press, 1966, p. 96; 
P.M. SHEPPARD, Natural Selection and Heredity, London, Hutchison Uni. Library, 1958, p. 228; and 
ERNST MAYR, Evolution and the Diversity olLife, Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard Uni. Press, 
1967, p. 114. 
2. Cf. ERNST MA YR, Animal. Species and Evolution. Cambridge. The Belknap Press of Harvard Uni. 
Press, 1963, p. 7; cf. also Max LèRNER, "The Concept of Natural Selection", ljuokd b) :-k\\ R in 
Evolution and the Diversity or Lile, p. 315. 
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new knowledge regarding the nature of such an important principle would be 
greatly diminished. We must carefully re-examine the doctrine of natural selection if 
we ever hope to fully appreciate the extraordinary subtlety of this most important 
biological principle; for much of it has been handed down from Darwin without 
serious reflection or re-examination. 3 
Since this paper is a philosophical consideration of the doctrine of natural 
selection, we must examine the various methodological problems that are connected 
with its explanation. Whereas it is the task of the biologist to discover and articulate 
the appropriate phenomena, it is for the natural philosopher to consider whether the 
actual formulation accounts for the phenomena; whether the principles are too 
vague, whether the scientist has proceeded correctly, and wh ether the conclusions 
follow from the given premisses. Thus, it is the dut y of the philosopher to point out 
any logical inconsistencies, contradictions, or sophistries ; to judge the strength and 
the character of the arguments; to warn of weaknesses or difficulties ; and to see if the 
explanations sufficiently deal with the evidence presented by the biologist. 
Natural selection cannot be justified by the principle of evolutionary biology, for 
it is itself a principle of evolutionary biology. There is nothing prior to this principle 
in biology that can justify it; but obviously we cannot use it to justify itself without 
begging the question. Nor can the principle be demonstratively proved by those 
things which follow upon it, for facts, however numerous, can never prove 
conclusively the truth of a particular theory. Although it is possible to show that a 
theory falls short of what it is trying to explain, or is sim ply false, when it does not 
correspond with the given evidence, it is not possible to show conclusively that a 
theory is true - or even possible - when it corresponds to the evidence, for a true 
conclusion can be derived from false premisses. 
Yct, insofar as the hypothesis predicts and interprets the evidence, it can be 
judged by its consequences. If the predictions are accurate and the interpretation of 
the phenomena is contirmed through experience and careful experimentation, then 
that which follows will support the hypothesis under investigation. These 
confirmations, however, can only give more credibility to the hypothesis; they do not 
demonstratively prove the hypothesis in the absolu te sense. On the other hand, if the 
hypothesis is riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions, and can neither 
account for the phenomena nor accurately predict the outcome of certain events, the 
hypothesis is invalidated by that which follows. For these rcasons, a true scientific 
hypothesis must be sufficiently determinate in order to be at least susceptible of being 
disproved, else we settlc for a pseudo-religion instead of scientific knowledge. 
Since the theory of natural selection is proposed as a hypothesis which is capable 
of accounting for the biological phenomena, it must be judged according to its 
consistency and its ability to explain why things are as they are. Hence, this biological 
hypothesis must be judged, whether negatively of affirmatively, by that which 
follows. 4 Evolutionary biology should not be the modern equivalent of the nebulous 
3. Cf. George GAYLORD SIMPSON, Major reatures of Evolution, New York, Columbia Uni. Press, 1953, 
p. 132. 
4. Cf. Sir Karl POPPER, Conjectures and Refutations, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963, 
pp. 36--38. 
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replies from the Oracle of Delphi that could fit any situation without difficulty. The 
actual arguments, difficulties and ramifications must be carefully examined. Yet, 
despite the raging controversies and the constant discussions concerning the principle 
of natural selection for more than six score and two years, few have seriously 
examined the problem formally, or to any depth, in order to determine whether the 
principle is fundamentally sound or not. 
Moreover, our thinking tends to be culture-bound and riddled with certain 
intellectual blindspots peculiar to our age. We are inclined to be overly pre-occupied 
with certain problems and seem to favor certain solutions. Ignorant of our lack of 
experience and understanding, we tend to dogmatize, giving more credence to certain 
arguments than are their due. Hence, even though we are unable to immediately 
resolve many of the difficulties, we should at least be aware of them, as well as our own 
limitations - if we are to proceed properly. 
Due to the limited scope of this paper, it will be necessary to restrict this 
enter prise to a general consideration of the major diffïculties with the Darwinian and 
neo-Darwinian principle of natural selection. Still, a general treatment of the problem 
will provide us not only with a better understanding of evolutionary biology, but a 
good framework that would stimulate and guide future discussions on the subject as 
weil. 
* 
* * 
The first premiss in Charles Darwin's argument for natural selection, namely the 
principle that every living being is trying to multiply in a geometrical ratio seems to be 
more of a weakly supported assumption than a brilliant observation of nature. 
Darwin borrowed this pre miss from the highly inf1uential British economist and 
sociologist, Thomas Robert Malthus, whose basic assertion was that whereas the 
human population had a tendency to increase in a geometrical ratio, man's 
ability to sus tain himself was only able to increase itself arithmetically. Darwin 
extended this principle to the en tire biosphere. 
Even presuming that this princip1e is justly applied to hum an populations, it is 
not immediately evident that it is justly applied elsewhere also. Every science has its 
own appropriate questions, arguments, and replies. 5 If, therefore, we try to extend a 
principle such as this, we ought to do so not gratuitously, but on the grounds of sorne 
justification. Darwin himself warns us of this: "analogy", he says, "may be a very 
deceitful guide." 6 Yet, despite this warning, neither Darwin himself nOf his 
disciplines offer any explanation or justification for the application of his crucial 
principle to the entire biosphere. 
There are multitudes of examples which illustrate the necessity for caution in 
extrapolating. The size of an adult human being might be sought by extrapolating the 
5. S, Thomas /\Ol11:-l.\5. ln Aris/Olefis Libros Peri Hermcneias cl Posteriarum Anal)'lifOrum Expori/ie, 
Turin. Marietti, 1955, lecture 21, n, 178. 
6. Charles DARW1~. The Origin of Species. New York. Modern Library, 1969. p. 370. 
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growth of a young child. But it is evident that one who extrapolates thus must 
account for the drastic reduction of the rate of growth of a man as he approaches 
maturity; failure to do so might obviously lead to absurd conclusions. We must take 
care, then, lest our extrapolations in biology become mere mental constructs of no 
value. If they are to lead to a more perfect understanding of natural things, they must 
be grounded firmly in the experiences of those natural things themselves. We might 
have sufficient data which reveal that Nature pro duces offspring at a fantastic rate; 
nevertheless, we must justify our extrapolation or assumption that Nature actually 
intends to increase at a geometrical rate, 7 and not that she merely intends to only 
maintain the present population. Hitherto such justification has not been presented. 
How, then is it to be shown that Nature intends to have the population increase 
exponentially? Our immediate experience of Nature does not completely conform to 
the supposedly universal character of this assumption. Sorne creatures, such as 
oysters and octopuses, are known to spawn a prodigious number of offspring; but 
there are others that produce very few young in their entire life, even under the best of 
conditions, such as it the case with bears, lions, whales, and elephants. Yet, according 
to Darwin's predictions, the population should al ways increase in overwhelming 
numbers whenever there is the slightest reduction of the checks. 8 Hence, those 
creatures with few or no selection checks should produce far more than those animaIs 
and plants with many checks or restraints. 9 The fact, therefore, that higher animaIs 
continue to generate only a few offspring seems to indicate that the principle in 
question, namely, that ail creatures increase exponentially, is at best not very 
universal, and at worse, sim ply false. 
FlIrthermore, one cannot propose as the reason why the higher animaIs do not 
try to produce according to a geometrical ratio, that the land would not be able to 
support their great numbers. For this would be positing sorne sort of foresight that 
would reject an immediate and real advantage in favor of a possible advantage in the 
distant future, an assumption which is most contrary to the doctrine of natural 
selection. It is moreover, begging the question. 
Why must one attribllte Nature's abundant production of seed and offspring to 
an attempt to increase geometrically? Our experience of Nature seems to indicate 
that she is merely attempting to replenish the present generation, nothing more. If a 
man makes eleven porcelain cups in order to replace his old set of ten, knowing that 
one cup normally breaks before he completes the set, could the artisan be justifiably 
accused of trying to increase the number of pieces in his porcelain set by any ratio? If 
not, how can striving be imputed to Nature if and when she produces more than will 
7. Professor Huxley tries to argue in his work, Evolution in Action, that the true generative potential is 
never obtained, even under the most perfect conditions. Henee, he has extrapolated to something that 
could never be confirmed in Nature. Professor Dobzhansky, on the other hand, admits that Naturc's 
generative potential rarely could be verified in reality. (Cf. his Evolution. Genetics and Man, New York, 
John Wiley and Sons, inc., 1955, p. III.) Either way, evolutionary biologists are holding a rather 
tenuous position. 
8. Cf. Charles DARWIN, "Linnean Society Papers" whieh are found in Philip ApPLEMA:-l'S Darwin, 
New York, W,W, Norton & Co. Ine., 1970, p. 84. 
9. Nor can one argue that the selectional checks do in fact exist, despite the lack of evidencc, without 
making a petitio principii. 
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finally survive? Due to the many highly contingent circumstances, Nature needs to 
produce a great number of individuals in order to insure the success of the few, 
cspecially in the lower orders of the animal and plant kingdoms. Perhaps we are 
scandalized by the great wastes necessary to successfully maintain a stable 
population; nevertheless, we may never start positing foreign intentions or goals, no 
matter how desirable, without first offering some determinate evidence or proof. 
Some evolutionary biologists, such as Dobzhansky, Mayr and Huxley, try to 
justify Darwin's tïrst premiss by pointing out the great increasc in population 
that follows a sudden and dramatic reduction in numbers or which follows as a result 
of a migration to a new territory. However, this must be seen as an exception -
which can never adequately explain the rule - and it could just as easily be used to 
defend the position that Nature intends to quickly establish, or in sorne cases, re-
establish, the population in its new environment. This action might be necessary, 
especially if the ecological balance is depcndent on immediately having a 
well-developed, but stable, population. 
One must remember that it is not sufficient, nor scientific, to examine biological 
entities in isolation, ignoring the harmony and inter play between their neighbors, 
predators, food supply and environment, just as one cannot scientifically investigate 
the motion of a body on earth without ta king into consideration the gravitational 
forces, the presence of nearby bodies, friction, air resistance, etc. Likewise, in order 
to dctermine the true generative potential of a deer, one must include ail the various 
factors and consider the degree to which each factor has an impact on the deer's life. 
Each science must consider aIl the factors which pertain to the entity under 
consideration and it must consider them in their proper context. One cannot treat the 
data out of context, nor extrapolate in such a fashion that the tïnal product is 
unrecognizable in reality. 
Moreover, if one tries to defend the validity of the first pre miss by arguing that, 
since there is a struggle amongst the individuals there must be too many offspring 
being produced, he has again begged the question. For Darwin's assumption that 
there is competition amongst the individuals is derived from the first two 
premisses, namely, that there is a universal geometrical increase in the number of 
offspring and that the number of adults and the number of species both remain 
constant. 10 Furthermore, if only the second pre miss of the argument is valid, one 
must conclu de that there is no universal struggle for existence, literally or 
metaphorically understood. A major element in the argument for natural selection 
would be th en rendered use1ess. 
The assumption Il derived l'rom Darwin's tïrst observation of Nature may indeed 
be true, but the proofs offered, at least as of yet, are not adequate to suftïciently 
establish Oarwin's first premiss. 
1 (J. The tirst two premisses of Darwin's argument for natural selection, as found in his work, The Origin of 
Species are as follows: First, ail organisms tend to increase so rapidly that the entire earth could not 
support the progeny of a single pair. (Cf. p. 52.) Second, despite this tendency to increase, the average 
Ilurnbcr of indivlduals and species remains relatively constant. (Cf. p. 59.) 
JI. The first premiss of DarwlO's argument, i.e. is an assllmption that Nature is trying to increase in a 
gcometrical ratio. derived from his first observation of Nature - tbere are instances where the 
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"Survival" has the connotation of a struggle for continued existence or 
grappling with an extremely difficult situation; these things are easily verified in our 
internai or external experience. Our tirst notion of struggle is in dealing with a hard 
examination, completing the last lap of a heated race, or going against the wind and 
sleet in a raging blizzard. Still, it is rather easy to extend the notion of struggle in 
order to include the cases where two hungry dogs are fighting over the same piece of 
meat, a salmon is swimming against the great rapids on his return to the spawning 
grounds, and the lion is struggling in the hunter's net. Darwin, however, wants to 
extend the notion further in order to include ail organisms and ail aspects of life. 
Hence, the insignificant pollen in the lowly wild-flowers and the towering sequoia 
trees can now be included in the universal biological struggle, although not in the 
same way that was first observed in man and the higher animais. Supposedly, one 
must struggle because of the great competition - there is not enough food, water, 
mates, and possible places in which to raise one's offspring. The outcome of the 
competition will be determined by the immediate advantages that the organism 
possesses over its neighbors. 
What is the product of the competition? Is it fitness? If so, what is meant by 
being "fit"? Is it being healthy, alert, strong, full of vigor, and capable of handing the 
daily problems encountered in living in this particular environment and around these 
competitors? These characteristics do not result from the actual struggle; rather, 
they enable the organism to have the ability to survive and reproduce. For these 
characteristics must be naturally produced or developed long before the actual 
struggle begins. 
While struggle is first and most properly said of man, one can enlarge the notion 
to include actions within the animal kingdom, and even in the plant kingdom. Sorne 
evolutionary biologists, however, seem to want to extend the notion even further 
than it was done above. 
For Professor Huxley, the struggle for existence means, nothing more than that 
a part of each generation will die before it can reproduce. 12 "Struggle" here no longer 
suggests combat or competition between members or against the environment; 
rather, it only means that something will not live long enough. This is not a new 
revelation or insight, for the platitude was already old in Homer's time. 
This different interpretation of Darwin seems to gravely undermine the actual 
impact of the first three premisses, 13 and ultimately, the entire argument, for natural 
parents generate great numbers of offspring. However, the assumption should not be confused with 
the observation. The observation is merely verified by our senses; the assumption needs sorne sort of 
justification other than the mere annunciation thereof. 
12. Cf. Julian HUXLEY, Evolution in Action, New York, Harpers and Brothers, 1942, p. 34. 
13. Namely, (1) that there is a universal tendency to increase geometrically; but that, (2) despite the 
tendency to increase, the average number of individuals and species remains relatively constant; and, 
as a result, (3) there is a universal competition amongst ail individuals and species in order to survive. 
(At this point, one should remark that the third premiss is not an observation of Nature, but a 
conclusion of the first two premisses. According to the doctrine, there must necessarily be a struggle in 
order to survive.) 
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selection. For natural selection is no longer viewed as the superior entity being 
selected over the inferior entity, or the adapted being preferred to the unadapted. It 
merely means that sorne organisms will never reach sexual maturity. The 
ramifications of this Interpretation are far more serious than one immediately 
suspects. Instead of giving us hypotheses that can explain the mechanism of biological 
change - that can explain in other words why things are the way they are in Nature, 
Huxley has reduced an expia nation of the biological phenomena in terms of actual 
causes to a mere description or statement of Iife and its unfortunate short-comings. 
Huxley has relinquished his scientific mission of discovering sound biological 
explanations for trite observations. 
Moreover, if individuals of a certain group reproduce at a greater rate than their 
neighbors, the first group will eventually outnumber and thereby e1iminate the rest 
from the stock or gene pool. Once again, it does not seem that the notion of struggle, 
literai or metaphorical, is essential to natural selection. 
Furthermore, it seems strange ta consider survival, as most neo-Oarwinians 
would have it, in terms of how long one's genes persist in the gene pool, especially if 
natural selection opera tes only in the here and now. If one's genetic contribution 1S 
abruptly terminated a thousand, or even a couple million, years from now, how will 
this future possibility alter or affect the individual's struggle in this environment and 
amongst these particular rivais or predators? 14 It seems that these biologists are 
equating genes with existence; that is, as long as the genes are in the gene pool, the 
organism, in sorne mystical way, survives or is successful in its so-called struggle for 
existence. l ; One should, however, be able to perceive that genetic contribution is 
ordered towards the preservation of the species and offers nothing for the individual, 
while the struggle of this moth against that particular bird is ordered towards its own 
individual survival. It is clear that we are considering two orders which are perhaps 
dependent, but manifestly very different; nevertheless, to ignore this crucial 
distinction i5 to invite confusion. Life is c1early something more than mere genetic 
combinations ; death is obviously something more than rejected genes in future gene 
pools. This moth might continue to contribute to the gene pool through its 
descendents, but unless it has sorne sort of effective defense or flight, it will sim ply 
become a tasty treat to a hungry bird and be no more. Perhaps we have 
overemphasized the role of survival in the biological world until it is no longer 
recognizable, but as least this moth has not, in its very real struggle for continued 
existence. 
Ali creatures vary; but in order for the variation to be perpetuated, the variation 
must be al ways in terms of life or death. Many prominent evolutionary biologists, 
due to the influence of biologists R.A. Fisher, H.J. Muller, J.B.S. Haldane, and 
Sewall Wright, now maintain that though the selective differences might be very 
14. Cf. MarJorie GRENE, The Understanding of Nature: Essays in the Philosophy of Bi%gy, Boston, Reidel 
Publishing Company, 1974. p. 164. 
15. Professor Grene points out that this position reduces to the absurd view that the entire biosphere is 
merelya \'Chicle to recombine and perpetuate the genetic forms. (Cf. op. Cil., p. 277.) Genes are not 
necessary forms. nor are they the epitome of the universe. Juxtaposed with our common experience of 
life. this notion is ridiculous. 
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small, even indiscernable, they are still very effective. 16 While this position is not 
shared by ail of the evolutionary biologists, it is most unscientific, and it is also 
inconsistent with the theory of natural selection. 
The most vocal dissenter to this position is Professor Simpson, who argues that 
we simply lack the ability to observe the efficacy of such a weak selective value in 
either Nature or the laboratory. Simpson had to concede, though with some 
hesitation, that the mathematical argument could not be substantiated and was, in 
fact, mere speculation. 17 
Moreover, even if the selective differences are detectable, it does not necessarily 
follow that they will contribute to the individual's survival or success in 
reproduction. 18 Natural selection, des pite ail the daims to the contrary, does not 
explain the reasons for ail of the differences between biological entities. 
Notwithstanding Professor Simpson's qualifications, the position itself seems to 
contradict other parts of the doctrine on natural selection. For, if the selective 
advantages are only detectable over long periods of time, it wou Id seem to indicate 
that natural selection cannot act in the here and now - it is too weak, too 
insignificant, or the selective differences are not sufficiently pronounced; rather, 
natural selection can only be effective over an extremely long period of time. 19 Yet to 
hold this would be unacceptable to neo-Darwinism which maintains that there are no 
trends or graduai movements in natural selection. Moreover, if natural selection is 
too weak to work at this moment, or at any other given moment, when does it work ? 
If, by the nature of the doctrine, natural selection has to select what is immediately 
advantageous, then it must be able to operate at any moment, which is impossible if 
the selective differences are only detectable - and for that matter effective - over a 
long period of time; the contradiction remains. 
Another problem with the mathematical proof is that it does not conform with 
the modern understanding of being "fit" in natural selection. Neo-Darwinians 
maintain that natural selection is only the survival of the "fit" and not, as it was 
previously maintained, just of the "fittest". The new imerpretation of natural 
selection employes a broader and more tolerant view of fitness which, incidentally, 
corresponds better with our experience of nature. 20 However, if the range of fitness in 
16. Cf. Julian HUXLEY, Evolution as a Process, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958, p. 3. 
17. Cf. George G. SIMPSO"l, op. Cil., pp. 118-119; cf. also SI\!PSON, Tempo and Mode in Evolution, 
New York, Columbia Uni. Press, 1944, p. 81. 
18. Cf. SIMPSON, op. cil., p. 78. Simpson goes on to argue that there is no proofthat something is adaptive 
or not, but the somehow seems to forget that the burden of proof rests on the person who asserts the 
position that ail differences have selective value, and not on the person who, like Simpson, docs not. 
19. Cf. M. GRENE, op. cil., p. 169; cf. also T. DOBZHANSKY, op. cil., p. 368. 
20. Bence, if the length of the giraffc's neck could vary up to 12 inches from the mean .:nd still be 
considered "fit", the difference of a mere half inch, although detectable, wou Id nOI render ilS owner 
ôecisively superior or infcrior 10 his ncighbors. In order for one group of giraffes to become superior 
and, therefore, selected, they must have considerably longer necks th an the rest of the community. The 
selective values of the modern interpretation must be larger, rather than smaller, th an the on es 
permitted in old interpretation of the theory of natural selection with only the "fittest" surviving. 
If, however, the differences must be significanlly decisive, there are aclditional problems: One 
advantage must be co-ordinated with a series of other changes. An additional change in neck length 
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ter ms of survivors and successful generators is much broader, the decisive differences 
must then be much more pronounced, lest every creature survive and generate -
with perhaps the exception of the sickly and deformed creatures. If the differences 
must be more pronounced, the selective values must be very significant, which is 
contrary to what was established in the mathematical argument. Therefore, the 
mathematical proof, des pite its awesome appearance, does not seem to be consistent 
with the actual doctrine of natural selection, nor docs il seem to be an hypothesis 
capable of accounting for the biological phenomena. 
Furthermore, if everything is explained (or justified) in terms of immediate 
contributions to survival or reproductive success, how would presently disadvantageous 
characters be preserved? For, as Professor Dobzhansky argues, a character must 
always be useful in order for natural selection to permit its development or even 
allow its continued existence. 21 Yet, despite our expectations, these disadvantageous 
genes and characters are, in fact, preservedY Hence, either there is a contrary 
principle operating that preserves these genes during unfavorable periods, or natural 
selection does not opera te at ail times. ln either case, natural selection, according to 
the present statement of the theory, is not an adequate biological explanation or 
mechanism. 
Even to argue, as sorne evolutionary biologists have, that these temporarily-
disadvantageous characters would be supported by natural selection because of the 
great advantage they will provide in the future, is Hot defensible. For, one would then 
be forced to show that natural selection would be ignoring - and not ignoring - the 
organ's temporary uselessness. ln other words, we would end up by denying the 
principle of non-contradiction, for natural selection would have to support and 
destroy the immediately disadvantageous at the same time. The continued presence 
of the disadvantageous gene poses a serious difficulty to the theory of natural 
'\election. 
Most neo-Darwinian evolutionary biologists would readily concede that a 
biological system is not operative until complete, and furthermore, that this process 
might take even long geological periods of time. Yet what happens to the organism 
while it is waiting for the specific random mutation necessary for completion? Forthe 
inoperative part will be a hindrance to the organism, and it will therefore be 
must be simultaneously accompanied by a host of changes in muscle structure, vertebrae, circulatory 
and neural systems, etc. And if not perfectly timed, these changes will be detrimental to the system as a 
whole and thus be e1iminated by natural selection. 
21. Cf. T. DOBZHANSK.,. op. cil., p. 368. In ail fairness, one should point out that not ail of the 
evolutionary biologists insist on such strict standards. The most vocal dissenters are R.C. Lewontin 
and G.G. Simpson, who maintain that changes will be permitted by natural selectionjust as longas they 
do not prove to be significantly disadvantageous. These dissenters seem to be departing from certain 
tenets of the doctrine of naturai selection. This might be accountable to sloppiness on their part or an 
inherit weakness in the position of natural selection, but most probably it reflects Lewontin's and 
Simpson's awareness that Dobzhansky's position, although a logical consequence of the doctrine of 
natural selection, does not explain suffïciently the biological phenomena. This insight is not 
infrequent: but it is downplayed by most neo-Darwinians. 
22. Cf. F.J. AYALA, "The Mechanisms of Evolution", Scienlific American 239, September 1978, p. 55. 
Since a force cannot act and not act in the same way and at the same time, there must either be anolher 
force or the selective forces are not strong enough to eliminale the disadvantageous character. 
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e1iminated by natural selection, which would favor a simpler, but more immediately 
advantageous, organ. Moreover, what would retain aIl the other necessary, but 
temporarily useless and even harmful, variations intact until the entire system is 
operative? 23 These corresponding variations in the rest of the system are necessary 
for the new character to be advantageous to the entire system, but everything must 
be carefully co-ordinated lest the new character should continue to be useless. 
Evolution, despite romantic presentations, does not have aIl the time in the world. If 
it cannot help this organism on this tree escape from this predator, it has failed to 
perpetuate an organism, no matter how perfect or useful the organism might have 
been. 
Furthermore, why would an organism strive to have a more complex system, 
especially if the more sophisticated system would be at a disadvantage until it is 
operationally complete? Optic nerves cannot serve any other capacity while they are 
waiting for the final development and complet ion of the eye. A "fat" ccII cannot 
double as an "optic" cell until needed in its own proper capacity. These cells have 
very different structures which will not permit them to operate outside their proper 
function. These differences are made for the sake of something that does not yet exist, 
yet the body will constantly attend to their growth and development. 
There are undoubtedly evolutionary biologists who would object to this 
approach as an oversimplification of the official explanation. Instead of ce Ils 
assisting in sorne other capacity until ready to operate in their originally planned 
function, these biologists would maintain that there is a series of slightly 
advantageous mutations which slowly develop the function. Hence, due to sorne 
accidentaI che mi cal change in the skin or surface of the body, the body acquires a 
miniscule sensitivity to light, which gives it a smaU advantage over the others who are 
unable to detect changes in light at aIl. Over a long period of time, this optic 
sensitivity evolves into a rather sophisticated eye by small chance mutations, each 
offering more and more advantages to its owner. 
This position is not without its own problems. First of ail, the chemical change 
or skin mutation must be reflected in the genes or it cannot be transmitted to the 
offspring. Secondly, if such a mutation is to be perpetuated in succeeding 
generations, a single instance of it will not suffice; many instances of the desirably 
must occur, and these instances must, moreover, be simultaneous. The likelihood of a 
mutation being successfully transmitted depends on the frequency of its occurence of 
such an event. A rare event, therefore, even if transmitted successfully at first, will 
usually disappear altogether.24 On the other hand, if a particular organism possesses 
an advantageous characteristic which is shared by other organisms, that advantage is 
not likely to be a selective advantage for its owner. Yet, if the organism does not 
share the advantageous characteristic with other organisms, how would the owner be 
able to preserve the advantage for as many generations as needed until the chance 
mutation is acquired by others. Thirdly, the possession of a primitive neural or 
23. Cf. James COPPEDGE, Evolution.' Possible or Impossible, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishers, 1973, 
p. 89. 
24, Cf. J.S.S. HALDANE, op. cil., p. 138. 
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optical system does not necessarily constitute a selective. For the organism must 
make a connection between the sense impression received through its recently 
acquired senses and the appropriate response to those impressions. If it can de te ct that 
the light has changed, but cannot distinguish between the sun going down and the 
shadow of an approaching enemy, the newly acquired sense is of no real advantage to 
its owner. The change of light must be already associated with danger; and if this new 
information is ultimately to prove useful, the animal must be able to react adequately 
by flight or defense. Thus, for instance, if the organism is permanently fixed to a 
particular rock or surface, the mere knowledge of an approaching enemy might 
utterly fail to offer anything advantageous in terms of life or death. Undoubtedly, 
this reasoning is based on the unsupported assumption that a primitive optical 
system, which is capable of distinguishing changes of light, would be sufficient for 
detecting enemies. It is, again, the author of such doubtful assertions, rather than the 
one who questions them, upon whom the burden of pro of rest. 
It is only on the presupposition that complexity is an advantage to an organism 
that natural selection can succeed as the explanation it daims to be. But supposing 
this presupposition to be true, why have the complex organisms not eliminated the 
simple ones? How is it that reptiles thrive in co-existence with mammals? Natural 
selection fails to explain clearly what advantages the complex have over the simplc 
and, moreover, why these advantages have not been hitherto utilized, as the 
doctrine predicts, by the more complex animais as of yet. 
There have been attempts to skirt this objection by daiming that it is more 
advantageous for the organism to live in harmony with a diversity of living forms. 
However, this counter-argument is a subtle appeal to order and finality - something 
which is blatantly unacceptable to a doctrine based on a blind causal mechanism 
working with chance mutations. 
Again, we must remember that utility is only to be understood in ter ms of 
personal survival or reproductive success. No matter how versatile our organism 
might be, if it is not constantly useful in these two aspects, it will not be preserved or 
be further developed. However, our common experience of Nature reveals many 
instances where things persist, and even flourish, although they are not constantly 
useful. 2S Nevertheless, a serious biological expia nation must not only be able to 
explain why things have disappeared, but, more importantly, to be able to explain 
how things came to be and why they are in this particular way. Natural selection may 
account for what has failed to survive and what does not exist; 26 but for what 
actually exists in the biological world, and for its remarkably determinate form both 
within the individual forms of life and in the order among them, natural selection is 
an embarras singly inadequate scientific explanation. 
25. To argue that everything is constantly useful, whether we can observe it or not, is simply begging the 
question. 
26. Cf. R.C. Li'.WONTIN, "The Basis of Conflict in Biological Explanation", Journal of HiJlory of Bi%gy. 
Vol. II, 1969, p. 41. Lewtontin has even go ne 50 far as to say that natural selection is no! an 
expIa nation al al!, but merel)' a statement of certain empirical [acts. most ofwhich record those things 
that did not survive. 
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Diversity, however, cannot be adequately explained by natura! selection; for 
often several different variations are equally efficient in contributing towards the 
individual's survival or reproductive success. For example, evolutionary biologists 
have in the past supposed that the evolution of horses with one rather th an two toes 
might be accounted for by a greater ease in running which results for the horse. The 
paleontologist O.H. Schendewolf, however, maintains that the actual number of tocs 
on the foot of the horse cannot be attributed ta natural selection, since running on 
two toes is just as efficacious as running on only oneY Or again, according to 
Richard Lewontin, the color brown seems just as effective for survival for the polar 
bear as the color white. 28 Alos, it is difficult to see why sorne plants need to be 
pollinted by insects when pollination by the wind is just as effective in normal 
circumstances. Stranger still, sorne wind-pollinated flowers possess much beauty and 
aroma even though they do not need to attract any insects whatsoever for their 
survival or reproduction. 
Natural selection does not seem able to account for most of the beauty in 
Nature, since beauty rarely contributes directly ta the individual's success in 
reproduction or survival. If the dove can succeed with a very primative nest of a few 
twigs, why must the oriole, which lives in the sa me envirol1ment, build a highly 
ornate and complex nest? 29 As James Coppedge points out, most adaptations or 
biological innovations cannot be explained by the working of natural selection, 
because they do not significantly, or even directly, contribute to the life of the 
generator or the success of his offspring. 30 Natural selection, therefore, fails to 
explain adaptation, complexity, diversity, and beauty in nature - the very 
phenomena purported ta be accounted for by the action of natural selection. 
According to Charles Darwin and the neo-Darwinians, if an organism fails to 
vary in the manner necessary for adopting to the changing environ ment, it will be 
eliminated, either by not being able to endure new changes or by being outnumbered 
by the more prolific neighbors. In other words, everything must adapt in order to 
survive, and what has survived must have adapted. 
These assumptions seem to have sorne difficulties of their awn, for the y do not 
appear to be supported in reality and are, in fact, contradicted. There seem to be 
sorne creatures which have not changed for eons but which still flourish along with 
their neighbors. If their neighbors had to constantly change in arder persevere, why 
did not they? Despite the graphic and numerous changes in the climate, the 
27. O.H. SCHENDEWOLF, quoted by M. GRENE, op. cil., p. 236. 
28. Cf. R.C. LEWO:\IIN, "Adaptation", Scientijk American 239, September 19n, p. 164. While there are 
sorne animaIs whose survival is substantially or even entirely dependent on their ability to blend into 
tht, surrounding environ ment, it is not essential to ail, especially amongst the higher animaIs. A bear 
might not have to work as hard if he possessed an clement of surprise with a white coat, but, as 
Lewontin goes on to argue, the color white is in no way necessary for the bear's success in 
reproduction or survival. But if there are adaptations which go above and beyond mere survival or 
reproductive success, then natural selection can not completely account for the existence of 
biological adaptations. 
29. Cf. J. COPPEDGE, op. cil., p. 88. 
30. Cf. T. DOHZH~ASKY, op. cit., pp. 367-368; cf, also F . .J. AYALA, Evolution, cd. T. DOBZH,\I\:SKY el al .. 
San Francisco, W,H. Freeman and Co., 1977, p. 498. 
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surrounding environ ment, and the introduction of new neighbors which might be 
rivais, predators, sources of food or carriers of disease, there have been many 
instances of animais and plants which have remained virtually unchanged down 
through the ages. Anyone who has been on a picnic recently has never worried about 
the possibility of the ant becoming extinct. The ant, the crocodile, the armadillo, the 
platypus, the oyster, the opposum, and a hast of other so-called "living fossils," ail 
seem ta nourish. 31 There are, on the other hand, animaIs which appear to be equally 
(or even more) able to adapt than their neighbors, which nonetheless become extinct. 
The North American horse possesses adaptive characteristics similar to those of the 
North American bison; but one is extinct and the other thrives. 32 The disappearance 
of the Irish Elk and the Sabertooth tiger is equally mysterious; many evolutionary 
biologists concede their misgivings about the likelihood of ever coming up with a certain 
explanation of these cases. JJ Hence, whatever actually caused their success or failure 
in surviving, we must refrain l'rom attributing adaptability, or lack thereof, 
for there is no evidence whatsoever that adaptability had anything to do with 
their continued presence or sudden disappearance. Il is not correct to maintain that 
everything must adapt in order to survive, that adaptation is a guarantee of survivaL 
or even that what has survived must have adapted. 
What does it mean to say that an organism with favorable variations will be 
selected and will survive and that one with disadvantageous variations 
will perish? Are we speaking of the individual? Assuredly not, for the individual will 
500n perish anyway. Are we referring, then, to the genes possessed by the individual? 
Perhaps, but if only a single organism possesses certain superior genes, those genes 
will quickly disappear themselves. If the advantageous character is recessive, it will 
disappear just as quickly unless the recessive trait appears very frequently 
in the stock. If, however, the imperfect transmission of the genes - mutation -
occurred with an individual, its offspring will differ from it insofar as they are the 
consequences of a superior gene combination while it is not. Again, what survives? 
The species? No; it must change with the fluctuating environ ment or face inevitable 
extinction. Hence, the transformed species may not be the same kind as its 
originators, sa the species may finally not survive at aIl. If the individual, genes, or 
species does not survive, what does? Is survival nothing more than an opportunity to 
make a contribution of genes to the gene pool which are slightly altered and slightly 
superior to those of one's competitor? This can not be the answer simply, for 
evolutionary biologists maintain that Nature does not strive, consciously or 
otherwise, in the evolutionary process. If the "great scheme" lacks drive or goals, it 
would seem strange that the individual should have them. Since neither Nature nor 
its members tend anywhere, selection can only be a chronic1e of survival of whatever 
happens to survive, whatever that means. 
31 Cf. Norman MACBETH, Darwin Retried: An Appealto Reason, New York, Delta Bks., 1971, p. 121; cf. 
also G.L. STEBBINS, Variations and Evolution in Plants, New York, Columbia Uni. Press, 1950, p. 518; 
and G.G. SI.\1PSON, The Meaning in Evo{Ulion. New Haven. Yale Uni. Press, 1967. pp. 101, 192-195 . 
.12. Cf. G.G. SIMPSO'i. Major Features in Evolution, pp. 294-295. 
n Ibid., pp. 147-148. 286. 
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One of the most frequent objections against the theory of natural selection is 
that il is a sophisticated tautology. Most evolutionary biologists seem unconcerned 
about the charge and only make a token effort to explain the tau toi ogy away. The 
remainder, such as Professors Waddington and Simpson, will simply concede the 
fact. For them, natural selection is a tautology which states a heretofore 
unrecognized relation: The fittest - defined as those who will leave the most 
offspring - will leave the most offspring. 34 
What is most unsettling is that some evolutionary biologists have no quai ms 
about proposing tautologies as explanations. One would immediately reject any 
lexicographer who tried to define a word by the sa me word, or a thinker who merely 
restated his proposition, or any other instance of gross redundancy; Jj yet no one 
seems scandalized that men of science should be satisfied with a major principle 
which is no more than a tautology. Until there is a successful resolution to this 
problem, as weil as most of the others already mentioned, the the ory of natural 
selection can never be seriously scientific. 
Conclusion 
One concludes this philosophical investigation with a perplexity similar to that 
which Darwin confided to his friend and colleague, Asa Gray, 36 that is: is natural 
selection a sufficient principle for Nature? Despite our apparent confidence in this 
controversial principle, buttressed by over a century of discussion and experimentation, 
we are not completely satisfied with the hypothesis, nor can we successfully answer ail 
the difficulties. We are still haunted by the same question that plagued Darwin a 
century ago. 
One can not help but be impressed with Nature's vast armory of defensive 
mechanisms and tools for survival of the individual and for the perpetuation of the 
species. 1) We are dazzled by Her skill and complexity, charmcd by Her graces and 
beauty. Yet we are frustrated, more often than not, with our own inability to 
understand Her ways. We are mocked by the dogged persistance offossil species and 
baffled by the mysterious disappearances of seemingly adapted species. We are 
embarrassed by ail the contradictions, incongruities, and problems in our 
34. Cf. W ADDINGTOS, "Evolutionary Adaption" in Evoution Ajier Darwin, ed. S. TAx, Vol. l, Chicago, 
Uni. of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 385; cf. also, SIMPSON, This View of Life, p. 81. 
35. Il.W. FOWLER, Dictionary of Modern English Usage, (by permission of Oxford University Press), 
p. 615: "To repeat the words or the substance of a preceeding sentence or passage may be impressive 
and a stroke of rhetoric, or a wearisome and a sign of incompetence, mainly according as it is donc 
deliberately or unconsciously." 
It is not the intention of this paper ta determine what is the purpose, or lack thereof, of the 
evolutionary biologists in using tautologies. However, it do es seem appropriate ta question whether 
this is propcr for a scicntilic explanation which uses a principle that is at best a rhetoncal play, or, at 
wor:;t, a sham. 
36. Cf. Charles DARWIN, Letter to Asa Gray, 26 November 1860, quoted by P. ApPLEMAN, op. cit. 
37. For an impressive consideration of too1s in Nature, sec André TÉTRY, Les outils chez les êtres vivants, 
Paris, Gallimard, 1948. 
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expia nations. Like Darwin, we find ourselves more dependent on our imaginations to 
carry us across the great gaps in our knowlcdge. The reasons for our difficulties are 
numerous and are by no means insignificant. 
Our tirst apprehensions of the biological world are confused and most difficult 
to arder according to any one principle. The biosphere does not seem capable of 
being measured by a single principle. For, while the lower animaIs seem to be ordered 
exclusively to survival and reproduction, the higher animais have other features and 
characteristics which are not readily reducible to the principle of mere utility. 
Claws, fur, needles, scales, barbs, teeth, sheIls, and thorns seem to be ordered 
solely to the defense of the creature. Moreover, many of the simpler plants and 
animaIs stop living once they have reproduced or only survive until their young can 
fend for themselves. We might be able to get away with rcducing aIl these instruments 
and bchavior to mere survival ; however, there are characteristics and animais that 
wil! not admit of such reduction. There are quite a few animaIs that continue to exist 
long after their reproductive cycle is over. While some animaIs try to generate as 
many offspring as the environment will permit, if not more, there are others that only 
produce one or two offspring in their entire lifetime. Darwin was baffled by the 
Fulmar petrel only laying one egg, and "yet it is believed to be the most numerous 
bird in the world." 18 What would be the advantageous factor of contemplation? Or, 
what would be bcautiful colors to a color-blind insect? Clearly, utility is not 
sufficient. Yet one must find a comprehensive explanation for the entire biosphere 
and complex enough to account for the vast diversity found in Nature, and not a 
mere chronicle of facts. If we have learned only one les son from the history of 
science, it is that this will not be an easy task. 
These are only a few of the difficulties that arise out of our inability to 
comprehend Nature, and Iikewise, to formulate an adequate hypothesis to account 
for the biological phenomena. N evertheless, des pite the inherent problems, there are 
certain things we can know of the natural world with varying degrees of certitude. 
Our hypotheses, if they are to reflect what we know about reality, must be 
measured in sorne way by reality. The conclusions to which our hypothetîcal 
principles lead must find their verification in controlled experimental confrontation 
with reality. Only thus can the principles themselves be validated. To accept anything 
short of this is to relegate our inquiry to the realm of the non-scientific. 
Since natural selection is presented as a mechanism capable of accounting for 
the apparent biological order and changes, it is incumbant on us to determine 
wh ether it is a suffïcient biological principle or not. If there are any deficiencies in the 
explanation, we must locate the source of the problem in order that we may 
successfully resolve the difficulties. One cannot successfully build without fifst 
establishing a good foundation, nor reach a distant goal with only defective bearings. 
ln order to determine whether natural selection is a satisfactory biological 
mechanism, we have carefully examined the arguments, terms, and ramifications of 
the hypothesis. We have found that sorne of the premisses have unsupported 
38. C. DARWIN, op. cil .. p. 54. 
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biological assumptions that were merely borrowed from other disciplines. These 
assumptions must be grounded in our observations and experiments and not in 
assertions and conjectures. The tautologies that were discovered must be eliminated, 
along with the petitiones principii, and the inconsistencies within the actual hypothesis 
must be corrected and be made to fit the phenomena more perfectly. We should not 
feel obliged to assume the presence of advantageous characteristics without any 
evidence whatsoever, for the burden of proof always rests on the person making the 
assertions. 
Moreover, the hypothesis must be enlarged in order to account for the fact that 
some disadvantageous characteristics persist and even flourish. We must accept the 
fact that the organisms or organs need not be useful at every moment in order to be 
preserved or developed. Natural selection must not only be able to explain why 
certain organisms accept temporary disadvantages in order to become more 
complex; it also must explain why the simple can still co-exist with the organism of 
supposedly more advantageous complexity. Unless we can show by the principles 
under judgement how survival can account for altruistic behavior, beauty, and the 
useless in Nature, we shall have to seek another principle that can do so. If the 
doctrine of natural selection cannot be enlarged, an alternative must be sought ; for 
no denying or ignoring the facts can fully satisfy our desire for a total and sufficient 
explanation. 
Furthermore, we must account for the biological order without lapsing into 
anthropomorphism. We must explain the phenomena without hi ding behind esoteric 
or scientific jargon in order to conceal our ignorance. Nor should we settle for vague 
predictions, reminiscent of the Oracle of Delphi, or accept su ch an indeterminate 
formulation that we can ne ver apply the hypothesis to the actual phenomena. 
The difficulties raised should not be ignored or downplayed. We must de al with 
them before we can hope to proceed further. Yet, des pite the present flaws of this 
hypothesis, we ought also to appreciate the great insights which the doctrine of 
natural selection and its major protagonists have provided for us; for it is al ways a 
source of delight to discover whatever intelligibility we can in the mysteries of 
Nature. 
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